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CHICAGO TAKES IT ON THE CHIN: IMPERFECT
INFORMATION COULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN
THE POST-KODAK WORLD
ROBERT H. LANDE*
Without information imperfections that lead to market failures the
world of antitrust would largely be the frictionless and simple world that
some Chicago-School adherents have unfairly been accused of believing
in. Even Chicago-School antitrust scholars believe that information can
be imperfect, but the degree to which information is believed to be
imperfect accounts for much of what separates "post-Chicago" antitrust
from Chicago-School antitrust. For example, the Chicago School tends
to believe that businesses should protect themselves by obtaining any
needed information, while the post-Chicago School believes that busi-
nesses cannot always do so effectively due to unanticipated needs or
overly costly information. The Chicago School believes that the market
will almost always supply any needed information, while post-Chicagoists
demand evidence this will occur. The Chicago School believes that subop-
timal effects from imperfect information are relatively rare, while the
post-Chicago School believes that they often are common enough to
affect competition in a market. The Chicago School believes that attempts
to cure alleged information-based problems are usually worse than the
problems themselves, while the post-Chicago School is more optimistic.
The Chicago School would leave these situations to contract law and
believes that businesses should protect themselves through contracts.
Post-Chicagoists are more likely to conclude that, since imperfect infor-
mation can affect competition and markets, those considerations should
be part of antitrust.
These differences were brought into focus by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.' This
opinion should erase any doubt over the importance of information
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author is
grateful to Neil Averitt and Joseph Kattan for extremely helpful comments on an earlier
draft, and to Jack Merritt for excellent research assistance.
'112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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issues because they significantly affected the Court's decision in two
places.
The first information failure involved customers' inability to predict
future changes in Kodak's policy. Before 1985, potential purchasers
of Kodak machines allegedly 2 understood that after purchasing their
machines3 they could go to an independent service organization (ISO)
for parts and service. Frequently these ISOs charged significantly less for
service than did Kodak. In 1985 or 1986 Kodak changed its policy and
any customer wishing to purchase Kodak's patented spare parts had to
purchase a Kodak service contract as well. Kodak thus instituted an
"aftertie" between parts and service, effectively eliminating the ISOs.
Customers could be exploited by the aftertie only in an environment
of imperfect information. Due to the "lock-in" factor (the cost that would
be incurred if a customer with a Kodak machine decided to switch to
a new machine) consumers could be exploited by the aftertie.4 If the
information possessed by customers before 1985 had been perfect, how-
ever, they would have anticipated that Kodak might change its policy
after the customers purchased their machines and were locked in to
purchasing spare parts from Kodak.5 The Court said that this was an
unexpected change that consumers of the machines could not reasonably
have anticipated.6 Competition involving machines, before the machine's
initial purchase, could not have protected these consumers effectively
since Kodak's switch was expected by neither Kodak's customers nor its
competitors. Even if a traditional structural analysis would indicate that
competition in a market should protect consumers, Kodak holds that
firms with small market shares can unfairly harm consumers by taking
advantage of imperfect information.7 One important lesson of Kodak is
2 The term "allegedly" applies to virtually every statement that this Comment will make
about Kodak.
' Kodak sold photocopying and other types of machines that were the subject of the
lawsuit.
For four ways in which this exploitation could occur see the discussion infra.
Customers who purchased a copying machine from Kodak before 1985 probably do
not have a successful contract claim because Kodak's pre-1985 policy of selling spare parts
to customers who purchased their service from ISOs was not a term of the contract between
Kodak and the purchasers of its machines. It merely was a change by Kodak in a collateral
(although important) policy.
6 It is unclear from the Court's opinion whether the 1985-86 change in Kodak's policy
was necessary for the decision. One indication that a change is necessary is that the Court
provided an opening twelve-sentence summary of the reasons why it granted certiorari.
Three of these twelve sentences concerned the facts in the case, and one of these sentences
mentioned Kodak's 1985-86 change in corporate policy.
' This conclusion would be unremarkable in a discussion of consumer fraud cases. But
it is a relatively new idea for antitrust.
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that imperfect information can trump the workings of an otherwise
competitive market and cause it to behave suboptimally. Imperfect infor-
mation can be the equivalent of traditional market share-based market
power.
This same manifestation of imperfect information also caused the
Court to define the relevant market in a narrow manner. Imperfect
information permitted the lock-in, and the Court defined the market
from the consumers' perspective after the lock-in was in place. If consum-
ers' information had been perfect they would have known that the total
price of a Kodak package, consisting of a machine, service, and parts,
would have been excessive, and they instead might have purchased a
competing package. But consumers did not consider these alternatives
as seriously as they should have because the information imperfections
(the calculation complexities) caused them erroneously to believe they
should purchase from Kodak. In antitrust, a relevant market usually is
defined in terms of the substitute products to which a purchaser might
reasonably turn.8 Information imperfections might mean that Kodak
could raise the price of its package 5 percent above the competitive
level successfully. Another important lesson of Kodak is that imperfect
information can be a crucial factor in defining relevant markets.
Kodak's second reliance on information failures involved customers'
inability to perform relatively complex life-cycle pricing comparisons.
When individual consumers are involved it often is obvious that informa-
tion imperfections can prevent purchasers from making optimal pur-
chasing decisions, but a noteworthy aspect of the decision is that all of
the victimized purchasers in Kodak were businesses. The Court stressed
that, as a factual matter, life-cycle pricing was extremely difficult to
perform accurately.9 Customers would have to perform this calculation
for all brands on the market to be able to compare costs intelligently.'"
8 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (asking consum-
ers' response if prices rise by, e.g., 5%).
'J Customers would have to know their machines' breakdown rates (in general and as a
function of the use of the machines and the expertise of the operators). They would have
to know the machine's trade in value, average usable life, repair cost, the cost to the
corporation of the machine's downtime, the appropriate discount rate, etc.
10 Some believe that businesses, unlike consumers, rarely can be deceived by imperfect
information. However, Kodak involved copying services that were for most of its purchasers
only a small percentage of their expenses. Law firms, for example, usually are expert in
purchasing legal or secretarial services, but might lack expertise in purchasing copying
machines. Moreover, the court noted that Kodak sold machines to large and sophisticated
businesses at a lower price, and these sophisticated purchasers often performed their own
service work. The Court further pointed out that government units often buy equipment
and service separately. They do this not because they are unaware of the desirability of life-
cycle pricing, but because the government units apparently concluded that life cycle pricing
19931
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The Court pointed out that this information was not available to consum-
ers from their own experience," and Kodak's competitors couldn't be
trusted to supply it.12 If plaintiff's imperfect information allegations were
true 3 Kodak's practices could harm economic efficiency and consumer
welfare in any of four ways that could be consistent with the facts in
Kodak. The four possibilities are:
(1) The "sucker" or "low ball" possibility. Perhaps Kodak offered a low
machine price followed by an unduly high price for parts and service.
The required life-cycle pricing could have been so complicated that
customers did not realize they were paying excessive amounts.
(2) Price discrimination against unsophisticated users. This possibility
is similar to the previous one, but Kodak apparently permitted large
sophisticated purchasers, who were unlikely to be fooled by the informa-
tion difficulties, to buy parts at a reasonable price and perform their own
service. Perhaps only unsophisticated purchasers paid excessive prices.
(3) Price discrimination against heavy users. A typical one-year service
contract might cost, for example, $12,000 plus $.0004 per copy. Of
course, the more a machine is used the higher the charges should be for
a service contract, but it is possible that the service contracts were de-
signed to extract maximum consumer surplus from heavy users.
(4) Monopoly in the service market. Competition usually leads to
greater efficiency and lower prices, and the aftertie eliminated competi-
tion. Perhaps Kodak simply wanted more of the service business free
from competitive pressures.1
4
The first three possibilities could lead to a wealth transfer from pur-
chasers to Kodak. All four potentially can lead to economic inefficiency,
although the economic effects of price discrimination are complex since
price discrimination can lead to greater or lower economic efficiency.
Discovery could, of course, demonstrate the existence of alternative
explanations that would be more likely to be procompetitive. For exam-
is too complex to perform correctly. If they can just get the best separate prices for the
machine, parts, and service they apparently will be better off.
The Court's conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the package consisting of a copying
machine, its replacement parts, and service is in certain respects a credence good. Unlike
the case involving many products, consumers who are overcharged when they purchase a
Kodak package may never know that they have been overcharged.
" Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2086.
12 Id.
"3 One would also want to know whether these complexities were inevitable, or whether
Kodak attempted to deliberately make the calculations difficult.
" See also note 10, supra, for reasons why information imperfections make an anticompeti-
tive scenario more likely and for reasons why reputation effects may matter relatively little.
[Vol. 62
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pie, if Kodak's machines used a risky new technology, a low initial price
followed by a high price for parts and service could shift risk from
customers to Kodak. Even if the total package's price were high, this
could just mean that consumers were in effect purchasing an insurance
policy along with their machine. Alternatively, perhaps many customers
were short of cash and a low initial price was desirable for this reason.
The Court did not hold that one of the above anticompetitive scenarios
actually occurred. Plaintiff was merely given the opportunity to attempt
to prove that one was more likely than one of the procompetitive possibil-
ities.
Kodak thus dramatically crystallizes many of the differences between
Chicago School and post-Chicago School antitrust analysis and suggests
that, at least for now, the post-Chicago School has the opportunity to
advance. Plaintiffs can at least attempt to prove their information-based
allegations. The antitrust world is only now starting to attempt to discern
Kodak's implications, including the following:
(1) Imperfect information can substitute for traditional market share-
based market power and can make a market that structurally appears
competitive behave anticompetitively. (Market share-based "safe har-
bors" are more likely to be inappropriate.)
(2) This imperfect information-based market power can harm consum-
ers through price increases or by distorting consumers' choices among
differentiated products.
(3) Imperfect information can create more narrowly defined relevant
markets because it can effectively prevent customers from turning to
certain potential substitutes. They may not know of an option's existence
or, more likely, that it is a cost/effective option. A finding of narrower
markets usually will have the effect of making it more likely that a firm
will be found to have market power."I
(4) Businesses, like individual consumers, can make information-based
mistakes that can cause them to be exploited. Consumer protection law's
assumptions about individuals' capabilities, vulnerabilities, and needs can
apply to businesses as well.
" If a court is more likely to find market power it is more likely to declare a tying
arrangement, vertical restraint, or monopolization strategy to be illegal. Merger results
could, however, go either way. If both merging firms have larger market shares the merger
is more likely to be illegal. If both firms are considered to be actual monopolies, however,
the firms may not be considered to be in competition and the transaction might not be
considered to be a horizontal merger.
19931
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(5) Information problems can be so great that they can affect the
competition in entire markets. These concerns are now a part of antitrust
law.
Kodak's focus on imperfect information could have profound effects
on the antitrust world. Our colleagues in the fields of consumer protec-
tion and contract law have taken imperfect information concepts very
seriously for years. Now we have to take them equally seriously and begin
to grapple with a significant and unanswered question arising from Kodak.
When is information imperfect enough to affect the choice of a large
percentage of customers 16 and detrimentally affect competition in a mar-
ket? Since information is almost never perfect this matter of degree could
be of the utmost importance. Although Kodak's direct precedential effects
on tying cases will be important, 7 a broad interpretation of the case could
shake the antitrust world. An expansive interpretation of Kodak could
mean that information imperfections alone (without the aftertie, the
change in corporate policy, the virtual absence of discovery by the plain-
tiff, or the other potentially limiting conditions that arose in Kodak)
can turn certain practices into antitrust violations. Many other areas of
antitrust law could be affected if we assume that information is often
significantly imperfect and that these imperfections can cause businesses
to make decisions that are exploitable through the use of practices that are
of antitrust concern. At least four areas of antitrust could be substantially
affected.
First, vertical restraints analysis could be affected significantly. Vertical
restraints are often justified by imperfect information and the inability
of the market to supply this information absent these restraints. Many of
the efficiency arguments used to justify vertical restraints-including
the point-of-sale special services "free rider" argument 18-rely upon the
existence of a large group of relatively ignorant consumers and a need
by the business to supply information about a product. Vertical restraints
may be one way to supply this information.' 9
" The calculation complexities discussed supra note 9, may be similar to those involved
in many purchase decisions, including automobiles and camcorders.
'7 Kodak's direct precedental effects will be somewhat limited due to the relatively unusual
factual circumstances involved, including the requirement of an aftertie and a customer
lock-in due to significant switching costs, the change in corporate policy, and the fact that
plaintiff had been permitted to take virtually no discovery.
" See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 89
(1960).
" United States v. Jerrold Electronics, 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61 (1960), affd, 365 U.S.
567 (1961), allowed imperfect information tojustify a tying arrangement. This case involved
a tie between television antennas and the service contracts to repair these antennas. The
tie was justified because, if the television didn't work following service by someone other
than Jerrold Electronics, consumers might not know whether the television's failure to
work was due to a problem with the antenna or a problem with its servicing. Since the
[Vol. 62
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If we grant that consumers are often ignorant it should be unsurprising
that purely vertical restraints can be used to disadvantage them. Professor
Warren Grimes recently showed how retailers can use resale price mainte-
nance to take advantage of consumers' information inadequacies in a
way that causes consumers to be exploited." Professor Grimes explains
how resale price maintenance can be used to guarantee large retail com-
missions so salespeople will have an incentive to "push" certain brands of
products. Grimes' model hinges on imperfect information by consumers
because, if consumers knew that the only reason why the sales clerks were
pushing particular brands was so that the sales clerks would get a higher
commission, the scheme would not work. Imperfect information is also
the foundation of Robert Steiner's and Professor Sharon Oster's analyses
of the anticompetitive use of resale price maintenance in the Levi Strauss
case. 2 1 Imperfect information can also lead to the anticompetitive imposi-
tion of exclusive dealing arrangements, 2 and information problems also
featured in Professor Howard Marvel's analysis of a tying arrangement
that did not involve an aftertie.23
manufacturer did not want to be blamed for improper service work performed by another
company it forced everyone who purchased its antenna to also buy a service contract. The
Court permitted Jerrold Electronics to employ this tie. If information had been perfect the
tie would not have been needed.
0 Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints
Revisited, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 815 (1992).
2 When jeans were a relatively new product for middle-class consumers Levi Strauss had
to use resale price maintenance to guarantee retailer margin and in effect buy shelf
space. During this period consumers' imperfect information concerning this relatively new
product led to the procompetitive imposition of resale price maintenance. After the product
was well established, however, resale price maintenance was no longer needed, and anticom-
petitively kept prices at too high a level. Imperfect information on the part of Levi Strauss
caused the company to fail to realize that it should have changed marketing strategies. It
kept using resale price maintenance longer than so doing was optimal for society (and
longer than it was optimal for Levi Strauss). See Sharon Oster, The FTC v. Levi Strauss: An
Analysis of the Economic Issues, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES 47 (Federal Trade Commission, Ronald N. Lafferty, Robert
H. Lande, and John B. Kirkwood eds. 1984) [hereinafter IMPACT EVALUATIONS]. (This
study also contains citations to Robert Steiner's unpublished analysis of the Levi Strauss
case.)
2 Gerald Brock's analysis of the Federal Trade Commission industrial gases cases in-
volved such a situation. The industrial gases market was changing, but manufacturers
realized that the change was occurring before their gas distributors realized it. The manu-
facturers locked their retailers in with exclusive dealing contracts. The retailers realized
too late that the exclusive dealing arrangements had disadvantaged them and competition.
Imperfect information (an asymmetry of information since the gas producers knew more
about the changing nature of industrial gases market than the retailers) explained the
imposition of the tie. See Gerald Brock, Vertical Restraints in Industrial Gases, in IMPACT
EVALUATIONS, supra note 21, at 386.
23 Professor Howard Marvel analyzed a technological tie between hearing aids and batter-
ies, and concluded that the purpose of the tie was to impose price discrimination against
heavy users of hearing aids. Consumers could, in theory, have engaged in life-cycle pricing
(they could have calculated the discounted present value of the hearing aid and the batteries
they were likely to buy). Since consumers were unable, as a practical matter, to engage in
1993]
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Imperfect information's consequences also could affect the legality of
franchisor/franchisee relationships. Once a franchise contract is signed
both parties often are locked in to some degree. Assume, consistent with
Kodak, that there is imperfect information at the time of the signing of
the franchise agreement and that some franchisees don't really under-
stand what they are signing. As time passes rents might accrue due to
the efforts of the franchisee-perhaps the franchise accumulates good-
will that is largely attributable to the franchisee's efforts. The franchisor
could engage in rent-seeking behavior using tying arrangements or other
vertical restraints to acquire this goodwill from the franchisor."4 Absent
imperfect information this rent extraction would not be a concern, for
no franchisee would sign a franchise arrangement that would enable the
franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill. But if, consistent with Kodak,
we posit imperfect information at the time of the franchise contracts'
signing, this kind of scenario might become an antitrust concern. Could
the contracts that contained the "unfair" tying arrangements or other
vertical restraints constitute antitrust violations?
Predatory pricing also becomes more plausible if we assume imperfect
information-i.e., if we assume that even businesses can be fooled or
make mistakes. If information is perfect, successful predation, including
the necessary recoupment of short-term losses, must be extremely rare."
A post-Chicago School view of the world, based upon the belief that
imperfect information is more common, would conclude that predation
this life-cyle pricing they were exploited through the tie. See Vertical Restraints in the Hearing
Aids Industry, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS, supra note 21, at 271, 328-29.
2" For example, the franchise contract could require that pizza franchisees purchase all
of their supplies from the franchisor at a monopoly price.
2r See Richard 0. Zerbe,Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655,658 (1982). The authors explain: "Predatory
pricing is a strategy for creating or changing expectations and can only occur when expecta-
tions are different or imperfect, or when information is imperfect." (footnote omitted)
(The omitted footnote reads: "Predation can occur when information is perfect, but actual
price cuts would not occur in that case. With perfect information, a simple threat would be
sufficient, and the predator would never need to cut prices actually. Hence, the predator
and the prey would immediately strike a bargain, agreeing to a merger, a buy-out, or some
other settlement, for all future action and reaction would be known. In the more realistic
situation in which information is imperfect predatory pricing can be used as a means of
conveying information in order to change expectations. Once the predatory cut is com-
pleted, the victim would only change his behavior if the cut changed his expectation about
the possibility of future cuts. Predatory price cuts will therefore only occur when the
predator expects to change the target's expectations about the predator's intention of
continuing or engaging in further price cuts. From this perspective, predatory pricing is
effective only insofar as it threatens further predatory activity. This phenomenon was first
noted in Zerbe, The American Sugar Refining Company: 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly,
12J.L. & EcON. 339, 363 (1969). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
124 (1972).")
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is more common. Even old-fashioned "deep pocket" predation" can
occur, as well as other types such as "reputation" predation2 7 and "noisy
pricing" predation. For example, if pricing and other terms are as com-
plex as the life-cycle pricing involved in Kodak, a firm may not realize that
it was being predated against. A firm might not take counter-measures
because it would instead believe that it was going bankrupt due to the
normal workings of the marketplace. Why struggle if you believe that
the would-be monopolist is more efficient than you?
Kodak's focus on imperfect information could even breathe new life
into the Robinson-Patman Act. Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act
require price discrimination. Before Kodak, traditionally defined market
share-based market power probably was a prerequisite for illegal price
discrimination. Imperfect information, however, can also permit price
discrimination to occur since a firm may not know how much it actually
pays for its purchases. Kodak showed that a business may not know what
it effectively pays for a product over its life cycle, and similar pricing
complexities can arise if credit terms, advertising allowances, return pol-
icy, service, special promotions, and other aspects of the sale are consid-
ered. These complications also can make it especially difficult for one
company to compare what it pays with the prices that its competitors
pay.28 Moreover, a firm is much more likely to attempt to give a discount
only to some of its customers when information is imperfect and other
customers in the same geographic market are unlikely to discover these
discounts. Thus, imperfect information could, in a Robinson-Patman
setting, be a substitute for traditional notions of market share-based
26 For example, if information is perfect and a would-be predator lowers price, an equally
efficient competitor will have an incentive to mothball its plant and reopen it after the
predation ends. If the intended victim runs out of money in the short run it can get a loan
and repay the loan out of its expected future monopoly profits. Since this mothballing can
happen, the antecedent predation won't often happen. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) cited Judge Bork and other Chicago School analysts
extensively and essentially embraced the view that predatory pricing was extremely scarce.
The antipredation scenario might not work, however, if information is imperfect. Sup-
pose the owner of the mothballed factory goes to a bank for a loan. The banker probably
would say-due to imperfect information-that he or she was not certain that the victim
was as efficient as the monopolist. The banker therefore would either deny the loan or
would loan only at an extremely high rate. Thus, if information is imperfect even old-
fashioned deep pocket predation might be possible.
27 If a company can develop a reputation (perhaps undeserved) for being irrational, its
potential victims might not fight back. Why struggle if the would-be monopolist is believed
to be willing to do whatever it takes to destroy its competitors? Of course, firms operating
in multiple markets can establish a reputation for predation that does not require imperfect
information. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUsr LAW 186 (1976).
28 Imperfect information thus might effectively satisfy the Robinson-Patman Act's "com-
petitive effects" requirement.
1993]
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market power, and provide the motive or cover for illegal price discrimi-
nation.
Kodak therefore illustrates the crucial role that imperfect information
plays today in antitrust analysis and also raises the possibility that its role
could expand in the future. While it is impossible to predict how much
difference information issues might play in the future, this clearly is an
area that requires further analysis by the antitrust community.
